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I. INTRODUCTION 
Right now is the greatest opportunity in over 30 years to curb the rising 
prices of prescription drugs. One of the last major pieces of federal legislation 
passed solely to reduce drug spending was the Drug Price Competition and 
Patient Term Restoration Act (aka the “Hatch-Waxman” Act) of 1984.1 Hatch-
Waxman is estimated to have introduced more than $1 trillion in savings over 
the past decade alone due to the availability of low cost generics.2 However, the 
U.S. has recently witnessed the prices of generics increasing, particularly older 
generics with little competition such as Daraprim and EpiPen.3 Coverage of these 
price hikes by politicians and popular media has invigorated a national push to 
reform many aspects of the system that regulates drug pricing – a system that all 
but exists in a free market economy.4 
In addition to price hikes on generics, new branded drugs have consistently 
become more expensive. Thankfully, new life-saving technologies have been 
introduced in recent history such as imatinib mesylate (brand name: Gleevec®; 
manufacturer: Novartis) for chronic myeloid leukemia, as well as cures for 
hepatitis C virus such as sofosbuvir (brand name: Solvaldi®; manufacturer: 
Gilead) and ledipasvir/sofosbuvir (brand name: Harvoni®; manufacturer: 
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 1. Drug Price Competition and Patient Term Restoration Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-417, 98 Stat. 
1585.  
 2. Letter from John E. Dicken, Health Care Director, GAO, to Senator Orin Hatch, Drug Pricing: 
Research on Savings from Generic Drug Use (Jan. 31, 2012) (on file with GAO).  
 3. SPECIAL COMM. ON AGING U.S. SENATE, SUDDEN PRICE SPIKES IN OFF-PATENT PRESCRIPTION 
DRUGS: THE MONOPOLY BUSINESS MODEL THAT HARMS PATIENTS, TAXPAYERS, AND THE U.S. HEALTH 
CARE SYSTEM 39–41 (2016).  
 4. Corrina Sorenson, et al., Advancing Value Assessment in the United States: A Multistakeholder 
Perspective, 20 VALUE IN HEALTH. 299, 299–300 (2017). 
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Gilead).5 Given the investment that pharmaceutical manufacturers make to 
develop these life saving technologies, many economists claim that the prices 
may be justifiably high.6 Nonetheless, these drugs seriously impact payers’ 
budgets when trying to cover the costs of newly introduced health technologies 
in addition to existing health services.7 And more so, the cost of high-priced 
drugs can be paralyzing to patients who are underinsured and must tradeoff out-
of-pocket copays for other necessities.8 
 II. PRIORITY POLICY SOLUTIONS TO HIGH DRUG PRICES 
A lack of fluidity in Washington, D.C. currently to pass federal legislation 
to address most concerns surrounding the rising costs of drugs has directed most 
actionable items to the state-level in the past three years. States are addressing 
drug pricing issues through one of two domains. First, states are targeting drug 
pricing directly for both branded and generic products.9 These policies are 
focused primarily on capping annual price increases so that the price at which a 
drug is introduced to the market remains relatively close to future prices. Some 
state policies are also addressing launch prices considered too high by some, but 
this latter issue is more difficult to address and might require emulating price 
regulation practices implemented by other Western countries.10 Second, states 
are exploring topics in drug price transparency. While constituents may know 
 
 5. See Rena M. Conti, et al., Changing the Cost of Care for Chronic Myeloid Leukemia: the 
Availability of Generic Imatinib in the USA and EU, 94 ANNALS OF HEMATOLOGY 249, 249 (2015) 
(explaining that imatinib was introduced for the treatment of chronic myeloid leukemia and other 
malignant diseases); Jay H. Hoofnagle & Averell H. Sherker, Therapy for Hepatitis C—the Costs of 
Success, 370 N. ENGL. J. MED. 1552, 1552 (2014) (explaining that ledipasvir and sofosbuvir are used for 
the treatment of hepatitis C); William V. Padula, et al., Cost-effectiveness of Tyrosine Kinase Inhibitor 
Treatment Strategies for Chronic Phase After Generic Entry of Imatinib in the United States, 108 J. NAT’L 
CANCER INST.,  Mar. 2016, at 1, 2 (explaining that generic imatinib is used to treat chronic myeloid 
leukemia). 
 6. Joseph A. DiMasi, et al., The Price of Innovation: New Estimates of Drug Development Costs, 
22 J. HEALTH ECON. 151, 180–81 (2015). 
 7. See Rena M. Conti & Meredith B. Rosnethal, Pharmaceutical Policy Reform – Balancing 
Affordability with Incentives for Innovation, NEW ENG. J. MED. (2016) (describing the prohibitive costs 
that payers must assume).  
 8. William V. Padula et al., Paying for Drugs After the Medicare Part D Beneficiary Reaches the 
Catastrophic Limit: Lessons of Cost Sharing from Other US Policy Partnerships Between Government 
and Commercial Industry, APPLIED HEALTH ECON. & HEALTH POL’Y, July 2018, at 2 (stating that 
copays can be quite prohibitive to people paying out of pocket).  
 9. See Shashi N. Kapadia et al., Strategies for Improving Hepatitis C Treatment Access in the United 
States: State Officials Address High Drug Prices, Stigma, and Building Treatment Capacity, J. PUB. 
HEALTH MGMT & PRAC. (2018) (describing how high drug prices constitute a barrier to accessing hepatitis 
c treatments and offering solutions for states to undertake to combat this barrier).  
 10. See generally Jaume Puig-Junoy, Impact of European Pharmaceutical Price Regulation on 
Generic Price Competition, 28 PHARMACOECONOMICS 649 (2010) (providing examples and 
statistics of price regulation practices among other countries and the impact on drug price 
competition).  
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what the price of the drug is in a particular market, the elements that go into 
pricing the drug are relatively obscure.11 A drug’s price is estimated to consist of 
the investment in research and development, marketing, profit sharing, charitable 
contributions, and potentially a cost component that is used to reinvest in future 
innovations within the manufacturer.12 However, few consumers, if any 
understand the breakdown of what the price of a drug goes towards these 
different elements. On top of that, drugs change hands several times between the 
manufacturer and the transaction at the interface between the pharmacy and the 
patient. In particular, commercial payers, wholesalers and pharmacy benefit 
managers (PBMs) potentially play a large role in determining the price of a drug, 
but their influence is unknown.13 Transparency laws would mandate the public 
release of information about components of the price of a drug; which include 
development, manufacturing and marketing costs.14 
In addition to transparency laws, states and the federal government are 
attempting to address a common issue created by PBM “gag” clauses. Under 
these “gag” clauses, a pharmacist is not allowed to disclose differences in the 
out-of-pocket costs a patient may face when filling a prescription.15 On the one 
hand, a patient would have to pay a certain amount based on the co-pay their plan 
has contracted through the PBM. Alternatively, there are potential out-of-pocket 
savings for the patient for certain prescriptions if they pay for it in cash rather 
than through their insurance plan.16 Thus, some prescriptions have greater 
insurance for out-of-pocket co-pays than the acquisition price of the drug. Many 
people consider these laws, which gag pharmacists from disclosing price 
information to the consumer to be unfair. Therefore, states and the federal 
government are exploring ways to lift gag laws and grant patients access to 
information that allows them to pay the lowest price for the drug in terms of 
personal out-of-pocket costs. The challenge to lifting these gag laws is ensuring 
 
 11. See Sabine Vogler & Kenneth R. Paterson, Can Price Transparency Contribute to More 
Affordable Patient Access to Medicines?, 1 PHARMACOECONOMICS 145, 145–47 (2017) (describing 
some of the factors that go into drug pricing in different healthcare systems, such as individual 
negotiations and agreements on products between payers and the pharmaceutical industry).  
 12. See Michael Dickson & Jean Paul Gagnon, Key Factors in The Rising Cost of New Drug 
Discovery and Development, 3 NATURE REV. DRUG DISCOVERY, 417, 421, 425–27 (2004) 
(describing how the value between pharmaceutical innovation and conventional production 
mechanisms cannot be accurately measured with common accounting).  
 13. T. Joseph Mattingly II et al., Estimating Drug Costs: How do Manufacturer Net Prices Compare 
with Other Common US Price References, 36 PHARMOECONOMICS 1093 (2018). 
 14. David B. Ridley, Price Differentiation and Transparency in the Global Pharmaceutical 
Marketplace, 23 PHARMOECONOMICS 653, 654–55 (2005). 
 15. Robert Pear, Why Your Pharmacist Can’t Tell You That $20 Prescription Could Cost Only $8, 
N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 24, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/02/24/us/politics/pharmacy-benefit-
managers-gag-clauses.html.  
 16. KAREN VAN NUYS, ET AL., OVERPAYING FOR PRESCRIPTION DRUGS: THE COPAY CLAWBACK 
PHENOMENON 1 (2018).  
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that the business transaction between PMBs and pharmacists is not negatively 
impacted. 
Given these multiple domains in drug pricing policy, states and the federal 
government have prioritized many pieces of legislation over the past 12-36 
months to benefit patients.17  
III. UNCONSCIONABLE PRICE INCREASES ON DRUGS AND DEVICES 
States have begun presenting legislation to prevent egregious increases in 
the prices of different health technologies, both generic and branded, referred to 
as “price gouging.”18 To establish that a manufacturer or distributor is engaged 
in price gouging, state officials will need to show that the price increases are not 
only unjustified but also legally unconscionable (as “unconscionability” is 
defined by doctrine in contract law).19 A relationship between buyer and seller is 
deemed unconscionable if it is based on terms so egregiously unjust and so 
clearly tilted toward the party with superior bargaining power that no reasonable 
person would freely agree to them. This standard includes cases in which the 
seller vastly inflates the price of goods.  
A classic case of price gouging is Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture 
Co., which involved a layaway furniture plan under which the customer, after 
missing a single installment payment on a stereo, lost all the furniture she had 
purchased from the store over the course of 5 years.20 The appellate court ruled 
that contracts may be found unconscionable if the transaction entails “an absence 
of meaningful choice on the part of one of the parties together with contract terms 
which are unreasonably favorable to the other party.”21 
Laws protecting consumers against unconscionable price increases have 
had different levels of success within states. Massachusetts has achieved perhaps 
the most comprehensive legislation by enacting a price gouging protections law 
that applies to both generic and branded drugs.22 The State of New York enacted 
a price-gouging law on drugs with an increase in price of 75% or greater.23 In 
 
 17. National Academy for State Health Policy, 2018 
 18. Jeremy A. Greene & William V. Padula, Targeting Unconscionable Prescription-Drug Prices-
Maryland Anti-Price Gouging Law, 377 NEW ENG. J. MED. 101, 101 (2017).  
 19. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§153, 208 (AM. LAW INST. 1979) (stating that when 
one party makes a mistake the contract is voidable if the mistake(s) makes the enforcement of the contract 
unconscionable (defined in §208) or the other party knew of the mistake or caused the mistake). 
 20. 350 F.2d 445, 447 (D.C. Cir. 1965) (explaining where the terms of a sale agreement provided 
that the company maintain title on previous items purchased by the customer until all subsequent 
purchases were paid in full). 
 21. Id. at 449. 
 22. S. 2202, 190th Gen. Ct., Reg. Sess. (Mass. 2017). 
 23. S. 2007, 240th Leg., 2017 Sess. (N.Y. 2017). 
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addition, Rhode Island, Illinois, Massachusetts, Oregon, and New Jersey24 also 
introduced price-gouging legislation that has not yet been passed. A number of 
states have filed failed legislative attempts to address price gouging: 
Washington, Colorado, Minnesota, Wisconsin, Mississippi, Louisiana, Virginia, 
Vermont, and New Hampshire.25 
The State of Maryland has played an important role in the passage of price 
gouging legislation, but also has illustrated some weaknesses of the law. In 2017, 
Maryland passed anti-price-gouging legislation bipartisan in both the House of 
Delegates and the Senate.26 The legislation reached the Governor’s desk, but was 
never signed into law. However, the bill was automatically written into law as of 
October 2017 since it remained unsigned on the Governor’s desk for more than 
6 months. This law required pharmaceutical companies to submit price increases 
of 50% or more to the state Attorney General’s office prior to implementing such 
price hikes.27 The Attorney General would then have the right to freeze the price 
hike if he/she would deem it unconscionable. 
The Maryland anti-price-gouging law was held up in lawsuits brought 
against the state by pharmaceutical manufacturing advocacy groups. As of spring 
2018, the lawsuit has been upheld, thereby making the anti-price-gouging law in 
Maryland moot. In a 2-1 ruling, the 4th Circuit Court of Appeals found the anti-
price-gouging law unconstitutional because it regulated trade outside Maryland’s 
borders, which is prohibited by the “Dormant Commerce Clause.”28 
IV. DRUG PRICE TRANSPARENCY 
A number of states have introduced transparency bills in order to better 
understand what components of a manufacturer’s costs go into the price of the 
drug. These transparency bills also would help consumers understand where 
prices might be manipulated by other stakeholders in the series of transactions 
between the manufacturer and consumer, such as influence by PBMs, payers, 
pharmacies and wholesalers. 
 
 24. H. 5390, 2017 Gen. Assemb., Jan. Sess. (R.I. 2017); S. 496, 2017 Gen. Assemb., Jan. Sess. (R.I. 
2017); H 4900, 100th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ill. 2018); S. 652, 190th Gen. Court., Reg. Sess. (Mass. 
2017); H.B. 2387, 79th Legis. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Or. 2017); S. 1590, 2018 Leg., 218th Sess. (N.J. 
2018).  
 25. S.B. 5995, 2018 Leg., 65th Sess. (Wash. 2018); ; S.B. 152, 71st Gen. Assemb., 2nd Reg. Sess. 
(Colo. 2018); S.B. 2841, 2018 Leg., 90th Sess. (Minn. 2018); S.B.. 874, 2018 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wis. 
2018); H.B. 137, 2018 Leg. Reg. Sess. (Miss. 2018); H.B. 243, 2018 Leg., Reg. Sess. (La. 2018); S.B. 
223 2018 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Va. 2018); H.B. 713 2018 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Vt. 2018); H.B. 1780 2018 Leg., 
Reg. Sess. (N.H. 2018).  
 26. MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 2-801(c) (West 2018). 
 27. Jeremy A. Greene & William V. Padula, Targeting Unconscionable Prescription- Drug Prices—
Maryland’s Anti—Price-Gouging Law, 377 NEW ENGL. J. MED. 101, 102 (2017). 
 28. See Ass’n for Accessible Med. v. Frosh, 887 F.3d 664, 666 (4th Cir. 2018) (holding that the 
Maryland price gouging statute dealing with the sale of prescription drugs violates the dormant commerce 
clause). 
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Nevada has passed multiple bills into law to address complete drug 
transparency. The first law requires that manufacturers and PBMs submit annual 
reports to the state on their separate influences on both their operating costs and 
how the prices of drugs are influenced by these costs.29 Manufacturers must also 
submit all planned price increases to the state in advance of such changes. The 
second law is targeted specifically at insulin, a treatment for diabetes.30 Given 
the concerning epidemiology of obesity and diabetes in the U.S., Nevada is 
concerned about the budget impact of insulin on local payers. Thus, they have 
required that all diabetes therapies with raised prices must disclose costs 
associated with marketing and production of these drugs. In addition, PBMs and 
manufacturers must disclose all rebates to the state; sales representatives must 
log all conversations with provides; and, nonprofits must disclose funding 
received from pharmaceutical manufacturers related to diabetes treatments. 
California has introduced legislation requiring transparency for drug 
prices.31 The terms of this law require that manufacturers notify the state of raises 
in the price of a drug by greater than 16%. This price increase applies to anything 
above that threshold over a 2-year period. 
A number of other states have explored various styles of legislation to 
tackle drug price transparency. Florida has passed legislation to require 
transparency on the prices of the 300 most frequently prescribed drugs.32 
Vermont passed a transparency bill on drugs with a wholesale acquisition price 
above $670 per course of treatment.33 Other states with price transparency bills 
in draft are Colorado, Connecticut, Illinois, Indiana, Louisiana, Maryland, 
Massachusetts, Minnesota, New Jersey, New York, North Carolina, Oregon, 
Rhode Island, Virginia and Washington.34 
 
 29. S.B. 91, 79th Leg, 2017 Sess. (Nev. 2017) (enacted); S.B. 539, 79th Leg., 2017 Sess. (Nev. 2017) 
(enacted). 
 30. S.B. 539, 79th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Nev. 2017).  
 31. S.B. 17, 2017 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2017). 
 32. H.B. 589, 219th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2017). 
 33. S.B. 92, 74th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Vt. 2018) (enacted). 
 34. H.B. 16-1102, 70th Gen. Assemb., 2nd Reg. Sess. (Colo. 2016); S.B. 737, 2017 Gen. Assemb., 
Jan. Sess. (Conn. 2017); S.B. 73, 100th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ill. 2017); H.B. 1150, 120th Gen. 
Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (Ind. 2017); H.B. 436, 2017 Leg., Reg. Sess. (La. 2017) (enacted); S.B. 59, 2017 
Leg., Reg. Sess. (La. 2017) (enacted); MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH–GEN. §§ 2-801–803 (West 2018); S. 
1048, 189th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Mass. 2016); S.F. 934, 89th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Minn. 2015); H.F. 1060, 89th 
Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Minn. 2015); S. 983, 218th Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.J. 2018); S. 7686, 240th Leg., 
2016. Sess. (N.Y. 2016); H.B. 839, 2015 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess.  (N.C. 2015); H.B. 3486, 78th Legis. 
Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Or. 2015); S. 2560, 2016 Gen. Assemb., Jan. Sess. (R.I. 2016); H.B. 1113,  Gen. 
Assemb., 2017 Sess. (Va. 2017); S.B. 487 Gen. Assemb., 2017 Sess. (Va. 2017); S.B. 6471, 64th Leg., 
Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2016). 
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 V. ELIMINATING THE GAG LAW 
Of all legislations on drug pricing introduced, gag laws appear to have to 
strongest momentum towards bipartisan support. At the federal level, the 
bipartisan bill The Patient Right to Know Drug Prices to eliminate gag clauses 
was passed into law. This bill was sponsored by Sen. Susan Collins (R-ME) and 
Sen. Claire McCaskill (D-MO) was passed on October 10, 2018.35 This law 
allows communication between pharmacists and patients on information transfer 
about out-of-pocket expenses, with or without use of a health plan.36  
In the past year, most states also passed laws to lift gags on pharmacists: 
Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, 
Florida, Georgia, Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Maryland, 
Mississippi, Nevada, North Carolina, North Dakota, South Carolina, South 
Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Vermont, Virginia, West Virginia. 37 In 2018, 
legislation regarding gag laws was considered, but failed in: Missouri, New 
York, Pennsylvania, and Washington.38 In addition, the Governor of Arkansas 
recently called a special session to order to look at ways of effectively 
eliminating the gag law.39 
 
 35. S.2554 — 115th Congress (2017-2018) – Patient Right to Know Drug Prices Act 
 36. See Trending now: State Legislation that Bans Pharmacy Benefit Managers’ ‘Gag Clauses’, 
NAT’L ACAD. FOR ST. HEALTH POL’Y: STATE HEALTH POLICY BLOG, https://nashp.org/trending-now-
state-legislation-that-bans-pharmacy-benefit-managers-gag-clauses/ (last visited Nov. 4, 2018) 
(identifying states that have recently enacted a ban on ‘gag clauses’ that forbid pharmacists from 
discussing cheaper prescription options with customers).  
 37. H.B. 240, 30th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Alaska 2018); H.B. 2107, 52nd Leg., 2nd Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 
2018); H.B. 1010, 91st Gen. Assemb., 2nd Extraordinary Sess. (Ark. 2018); S.B. 1021, 2017-2018 Gen. 
Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2018); H.B.18-1284, 71st Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Colo. 2018); S.B. 445, 
2017 Reg. Sess. (Conn. 2017); H.B. 425, 149th Gen. Assemb., Reg Sess. (Del. 2018); H.B. 351, 2018 
Leg., Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2018); H.B. 276, 2017-2018 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ga. 2017); H.B. 1317, 120th 
Gen. Assemb., 2nd Reg. Sess. (Ind. 2018); S.B. 351, 2017-2018 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Kan. 2018); H.B. 463,  
2018 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ky 2018); S.B. 241, 2018 Leg., Reg. Sess. (La. 2018); S.P. 10, 128th 
Leg, Reg. Sess. (Me. 2017); S.B. 576, 438th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Md. 2018); H.B. 426. 2018 Leg., 
Reg. Sess. (Miss. 2018); S.B. 539 78th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Nev. 2017); H.B. 1791, 2018 Gen. Assemb, Reg. 
Sess. (N.H. 2018); H.B. 466, 2017 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (N.C. 2017); S.B. 2258, 65th Leg., Reg. 
Sess. (N.D. 2017); H.B. 5038, 122nd Leg., Reg. Sess. (S.C. 2018); S.B. 141, 93rd Leg., Reg. Sess. (S.D. 
2018); S.B. 2362, 110th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Tenn. 2018); S.B. 1076, 85th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Tex. 
2017); S.B. 208, 2018 Leg., Gen. Sess. (Utah 2018); S.B. 92, 2018 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Vt. 2018); 
H.B. 1177, 2018 Gen Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Va. 2018); S.B. 46, 83rd Leg., Reg. Sess. (W. Va. 2018)  
 38. S.B. 466 99th Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (Mo 2018); S.B. 7191, 2017-2018 Gen. Assemb., 
Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2017); S.B. 637 2017 Gen. Assemb., 2017 Sess. (Pa 2017); H.B. 2623 65th Leg., Reg. 
Sess. (Wash. 2018) 
 39. Erika Ferrando, State of Arkansas to Fight for Oversight on Pharmacy Benefits Managers in 
Special Session, THV11 (March 12, 2018, 6:46 PM), https://www.thv11.com/article/news/local/state-of-
arkansas-to-fight-for-oversight-on-pharmacy-benefits-managers-in-special-session/91-527956457. 
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VI. OTHER EFFECTIVE DRUG PRICING POLICIES 
The State of New York recently passed a law establishing an expenditure 
cap on drugs prescribed for Medicaid patients.40 Above a particular threshold of 
expenditures for Medicaid eligible patients, the state now requires manufacturers 
to provide rebates for the excessive cost of certain drugs.41 This threshold is 
based on the total cost of drug expenditures per patient, and is not limited to only 
certain classes of drugs.42 Thus, every drug manufacturer must be prepared to 
provide rebates to the New York State Medicaid program if they wish to have 
their drugs on the Medicaid formulary. 
The City of Chicago created a new city ordinance requiring pharmaceutical 
sales personnel to log conversations with all providers regarding the marketing 
and prescribing of drugs they represent.43 In addition, sales personnel wishing to 
market to providers in Chicago must obtain a city license. This policy is the first 
of its kind to monitor interactions between pharmaceutical sales and providers. 
VII. OTHER CURRENT POLICY PROPOSALS 
The U.S. is the only Western country that does not use price regulation at 
onset at a national level. In the fall of 2018, the Trump Administration  proposed 
a change to this with the introduction of foreign valuations on drug prices, known 
as “external reference pricing” on drugs administered in U.S. doctors’ offices 
and hospitals, otherwise known as Medicare Part B.44 External reference pricing 
would mainly reference prices calculated by other countries using methods in 
health technology assessment (e.g. cost-benefit analysis) to determine the price 
of the drug valued by its target outcome.  
European countries have used methods such as cost-effectiveness analysis 
at societal willingness-to-pay thresholds.45 For instance, the National Institute 
for Health and Care Excellence (NICE) in the U.K. uses cost per quality-adjusted 
life year (QALY) willingness-to-pay thresholds that vary by the priority of the 
drug indication.46 Drugs for managing common chronic and acute conditions 
such as hypertension or influenza may have lower thresholds in the range of 
£20,000-25,000 per QALY. Whereas, drugs with life-saving indications such as 
 
 40. S. 2007B/A. 3007B, 240th Sen. Assemb., 2017 Sess. (N.Y. 2017). 
 41. Id.  
 42. Id.  
 43. CITY OF CHICAGO RULES, PHARMACEUTICAL REPRESENTATIVE LICENSE § 4 (2017). 
 44. Rachel Sachs, Administration Outlines Plan to Lower Pharmaceutical Prices In Medicare Part 
B, HEALTH AFFAIRS BLOG (October 26, 2018), 
https://www.healthaffairs.org/do/10.1377/hblog20181026.360332/full/.  
 45. See Laura Vallejo-Torres et al., On Estimating the Cost-Effectiveness Threshold: Why, What, 
How?, 19 VALUE IN HEALTH 558 (2016) (identifying methodologies for estimating cost-effectiveness 
thresholds in healthcare systems).  
 46. Adrian Towse & Clive Pritchard, National Institute for Clinical Excellence (NICE): Is Economic 
Appraisal Working, 20 PHARMACOECONOMICS 95, 99 (2002).  
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for cancer, HIV/AIDS and hepatitis C virus may be assigned greater thresholds 
near £30,000 per QALY.  
While the approach has never been applied explicitly by U.S. payers such 
as Medicare programs, the Trump Administration views this proposal as a 
negotiation process between drug manufacturers and commercial payers to 
establish rates of some drugs. It could be used effectively by Medicare to 
establish a place to initiate negotiation, perhaps with binding arbitration. 
However, owning this critical task has tradeoffs. External reference pricing could 
protect American patients while restraining price hikes domestically, however 
the pricing would be based on non-U.S. values of drug outcomes. There is 
concern that external reference pricing could stymie innovation as it has done in 
other international markets since the prices would unlikely account for the cost 
of research and development. 
 VIII. CONCLUSIONS 
As a nation, the U.S. has not been effective at addressing some of the 
greatest concerns of rising expenditures and prices on drugs. In lieu of federal 
action, states have successfully introduced and passed several laws that appear 
to be making a difference. The introduction of rate setting and transparency 
programs at the state level, as well as gag laws at the federal and state levels is 
effectively providing patients with a better outlook for lower priced drugs. 
However, there will continue to be disparities in accessibility to drugs based on 
price between states as some states achieve progression in drug pricing policies 
while others lag behind. 
A unified effort to implement new drug pricing policies across the U.S. will 
ultimately continue to depend on federal action. It may be possible to witness 
federal adoption of some of these rate setting and transparency policies in the 
near future if multiple states can pass consistent laws, which is being witnessed. 
For instance, the passage of the federal gag law came after the same legislation 
passed across Nevada, Connecticut and Maryland. Likewise, the same anti-price-
gouging law that appeared in Maryland is being presented as a bill in Wisconsin 
and Illinois among other states.47 However, industry reaction to these laws in the 
form of effective lawsuits has created a “whack-a-mole” scenario for states, such 
that as Wisconsin and Illinois may have effective anti-price-gouging legislation 
in the next year, while Maryland’s is currently held up in a legal battle. Sustained 
unification of these policies across many states is the most likely way that federal 
government will take notice and introduce new drug pricing legislation in the 
future. 
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One element of these policies to note is the level of bipartisan support seen 
state by state with the introduction of these bills. Drug pricing does not appear to 
be an argumentative issue across party lines. Most of the legislation mentioned 
above has passed bipartisan in conservative states including Florida and 
Montana, purple states like Michigan, and progressive states including Maryland 
and Massachusetts.48 Concerted efforts to pass drug pricing legislation 
simultaneously will make single-state legal battles less likely. 
 
 
 48. H.B. 351, 25th Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2018); H.B. 628, 65th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Mont. 2017); 
S.B. 502, 49th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Mich. 2015); S.B. 1079, 438th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Md. 2018); S. 
221, 198th Gen. Court, Reg. Sess. (Mass. 2017). 
